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I. INTRODUCTION
IF TEENAGERS ARE ACCORDED AUTONOMY RIGHTS ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THEY
ARE CAPABLE OF MAKING CHOICES AS WELL AS ADULTS, THEN PERHAPS THERE IS LIT-
TLE JUSTIFICATION FOR A SEPARATE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM. AND CONVERSELY, IF
AN ADOLESCENT'S CHOICE TO COMMIT A CRIME SHOULD BE "RESPECTED" BY SUBJECT-
ING IT TO THE SAME TREATMENT GIVEN AN ADULT'S DECISION, THERE IS LITTLE JUSTI-
FICATION FOR DENYING AUTONOMY RIGHTS TO TEENAGERS IN OTHER LEGAL
CONTEXTS. I
In the recent past, several young people convicted of capital crimes
received life-term sentences in adult prisons or even the death penalty-punish-
ments that seem incompatible with the young age of the defendants. When a
fifteen-year-old commits a serious crime for which adult punishment is possi-
ble, many juvenile justice advocates decry the use of the adult penal system to
contend with "children" too immature to consider the ramifications of their
actions before committing their crimes. These advocates raise concerns about
adolescent impulsiveness, the pull of peer pressure and, in more recent times,
point to research on the still growing adolescent brain to justify their view that
the law should not treat juveniles as adults when meting out justice. Those who
argue against such harsh penalties for young people do so, at least in part, based
on a belief in adolescent decisional incapacity. In other words, young people
lack the decision-making ability necessary to justify imposing adult sentences
upon them even for the most heinous crimes.
By contrast, when faced with a pregnant fifteen-year-old seeking to access
abortion services or prenatal care, some advocates for young people in the
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healthcare decision-making arena argue that adolescents do posses the maturity
and competence to reason through options and make critical healthcare deci-
sions without the knowledge or consent of parents. On this end of the spec-
trum, advocates seek enhanced decision-making rights for adolescents by
claiming that most adolescents are in fact developmentally capable of meaning-
fully participating in and even independently directing their own healthcare.
Advocates have made this argument particularly strenuously in the context of
abortion rights for young women though it also appears in other healthcare
contexts.
Given these potentially clashing views of adolescent decision-making
capacity, it is possible that advocates for juveniles in these two areas of law
undermine each other's causes and are at serious odds with each other. This
seeming divide between people who claim allegiance to and concern for young
people and who may, in fact, believe deeply in the other's cause marks two
groups of advocates for young people who are on divergent paths. Juvenile
justice advocates march toward a future in which the criminal justice system,
with few exceptions, consistently presumes adolescent developmental deficien-
cies significant enough to protect young defendants from much criminal
responsibility and certainly sufficient to protect young people from prosecution
and punishment as adults. At the same time, many healthcare advocates march
toward an opposite future in which those in the healthcare system presume
adolescent developmental capacity also with few exceptions.
In the quest for a unified and all-encompassing legal regime governing
adolescents across areas of law, one might simply choose one understanding of
general adolescent competence or incompetence and apply it across the board.
Arguably, a unified vision is a worthwhile goal if it replaces the present patch-
work of common and statutory law dealing directly or indirectly with questions
of competence and young people. However, embracing one view of the devel-
opmental capacity of adolescents seems to preclude embracing the other. In
choosing a single position, one fears that adolescents will be left unduly vulner-
able either in the criminal courts or in the offices of their healthcare providers.
This article seeks to understand the divide between groups of advocates
and stake out a compromise position that supports an integrated system of mea-
suring adolescent competence across different areas of the law. Ultimately, I
conclude that there is an underlying consistency in these different views of
adolescent competence or decision-making capacity. Therefore, they can
peacefully coincide and be reconciled so that the assertion of one position does
not diminish the claim of the other.
When speaking to each other, juvenile justice advocates and healthcare
advocates have little trouble embracing each other's positions on adolescent
competence and perceive no lapse in logic in their claims. My concern, how-
ever, is with a wider audience of judges and policymakers who remain uncon-
vinced that one can make claims of both competence and incompetence in the
same breath. Rather than preaching to the converted, this article seeks to create
a few more converts and begins with the assumption that advocates for young
people, in whatever field, must explain their embrace of the fluctuating nature
of competence such that the same young person can be competent in one realm
and concurrently incompetent in another. This concept of elasticity seems quite
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intuitive, but is too frequently masked in discussions that leave a reader with an
impression of competence as a rigid construct.
Part I discusses various ways of understanding competence and decision-
making capacity for adolescents. This section illustrates that the core elements
of these concepts are the same when deployed by juvenile justice advocates or
those debating healthcare decision-making rights for young people.
Part II delineates how advocates in the healthcare arena have articulated
their belief in wide adolescent decision-making competence in this realm with a
specific focus on abortion. The section concludes with a discussion of
Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Part III shifts focus to describe how different parties have discussed issues
of adolescent development and competence in the criminal context. It con-
cludes with a discussion of how the Supreme Court has confronted this issue.
Part IV queries whether there is in fact a divide between the two articu-
lated positions of adolescent competence. The section describes the pros and
cons of creating a unified vision of adolescents for purposes of configuring
them in the law. This section then works to reconcile the two positions by
acknowledging the complexity of the inquiry and exploring the possibility that
contrasting views of adolescent competence in different contexts are in fact
quite compatible. I argue that the milieu in which young people make deci-
sions, i.e., in formal versus informal settings, demonstrably affects the quality
of the decision-making process. As such, it is logical to conclude that the deci-
sion-making process in formal healthcare settings leads to better decisions that
the law should support than is the case in the informal settings in which young
people decide to participate in criminal activities. As such, any presumptions
of decisional-capacity and responsibility for those decisions can and should be
different in the healthcare arena versus the criminal arena.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF COMPETENCE
This section grounds the remaining discussion in this article by defining
the terms competence and decision-making capacity as used in this piece. In a
quest to understand any potential conflict between advocates and to dictate a
compromise position between polarized opinions, it is first necessary to detail
how healthcare advocates and juvenile justice advocates understand the con-
cepts of competence and decision-making capacity.
As an initial matter, one must ascertain whether advocates on both sides of
the adolescent competence discussion mean the same thing when they refer to a
minor's' competence. Defining competence is a difficult task in part because
2 Throughout this piece, I use the terms juvenile, adolescent, and minor interchangeably to
refer to those under the age of eighteen. As a myriad of state statutes make clear, the age of
eighteen has great legal significance and generally marks the dividing line between child-
hood and adulthood for purposes of legal rights and responsibilities, including the fight to
vote or serve on a jury. This is not to say that there are no other significant birthdays along
the path to legal adulthood. For instance, the legal drinking age in the states is twenty-one.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 28-1-5 (2003); ARiz. REV. STAT. § 4-101 (2004); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 12-47-901 (2003); FLA. STAT. § 562.11 (2003). With some restrictions, young people can
earn a driver's license upon turning sixteen. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 28.15.055 (Michie
2003); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. I § 16-103 (2001); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.308
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the concept does not lend itself to simple definitions. It has been described as
"the ability to 'perform a task,' entailing the capacity to understand informa-
tion, deliberate, and decide." 3 The definitional difficulty is heightened by the
fact that this slippery concept exists across a broad spectrum of discussions
about legal rights and responsibilities. An all-encompassing discussion of the
many ways in which the law addresses questions of competence is beyond the
scope of this article. For the sake of brevity, this section will focus on a few
distinguishable points at which competence becomes an issue within the realms
of healthcare and the criminal law, evaluate what substantive content various
authors give to these terms, and assess how that content overlaps across areas
of the law.
A. Healthcare Decision-Making and Developmental Capacity
In the realm of healthcare decision-making, specifically decisions about
end-of-life care requiring an extremely high level of decisional capacity, the
Hastings Center defines that capacity as existing when a patient has: "(a) the
ability to comprehend information relevant to the decision, (b) the ability to
deliberate [about choices] in accordance with [personal] values and goals, and
(c) the ability to communicate [verbally or nonverbally] with caregivers."4 To
meet this standard, a patient must be able to both reach a decision and commu-
(West 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-12-6 (Michie 2003). Other states issue unrestricted
licenses to those sixteen or older, see, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-5-105 (2005); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 39-06-03 (1997), or those older than seventeen, see. e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 42-2-105.5 (2003); IDAHO CODE § 49-303 (Michie 2003). In a small number of states, a
minor may consent to marriage, without parental permission, before the age of eighteen.
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 106.010 (2003) (young person age seventeen or older may con-
sent to marriage); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-2 (2004) (young person age sixteen or older may
consent to marriage); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 551.51 (1998) (young person age sixteen or
older may consent to marriage).
This article does not purport to speak to the difficulties of evaluating competence and
decision-making capacity for pre-adolescent children-a task even more daunting than mak-
ing this determination for adolescents. A basic premise of this article is that it is frequently a
mistake to use the terms child or children to refer to all of those under the age of eighteen
without reflecting on the significant developmental divide between those who have not yet
reached adolescence and those who are closer to the end of their legal minority. By conflat-
ing these groups of minors, the law fails to appreciate the degree to which outcomes of
competence evaluations will frequently be extremely different for adolescents versus young
children.
3 Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 51 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1265, 1266 (2000); see also Preston A. Britner, Suzanne J. LaFleur & Amy J.
Whitehead, Psychology and the Law: Evaluating Juveniles' Competence to Make Abortion
Decisions: How Social Science Can Inform the Law, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 35, 36
(1998) ("This disparity in standards for competence across legal domains underscores the
political climate of contemporary legal policy and highlights the difficulty of defining 'com-
petence' and applying such a definition, both within any one domain as well as across
domains.").
' THE HASTINGS CTR., GUIDELINES ON TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND
THE CARE OF THE DYING (1987); see also Jessica Wilen Berg et al., Constructing Compe-
tence: Formulating Standards of Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48
RUTGERS L. REV. 345, 351 (1996) (citations omitted).
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nicate that decision to the appropriate people.' A patient who cannot meet
these criteria is legally incompetent to make healthcare decisions.
A patient's ability to understand relevant information requires only that
she grasp the concepts involved in an informed consent discussion.6 Thus, to
meet the elements of the decision-making capacity inquiry, she must harbor an
ability to appreciate the nature of the situation and its likely consequences by
"apply[ing] information that is understood in a context-neutral sense to his or
her own situation. .... 7 A patient with decision-making capacity will be able
to manipulate information rationally, meaning that she will be able to weigh
logically the risks and benefits of a proposed course of action.8
Though the law generally does not allow those under the age of eighteen
to independently consent to healthcare, there are still circumstances in which it
is necessary to evaluate the competence of minor patients. In such a case, just
as is true for adults, an evaluator must determine the young person's "under-
standing of the proposed intervention, the risks, indications and alternatives,
and the short-and long-term consequences of the decision." 9
The healthcare decision-making capacity of minors frequently emerges in
discussions about abortion. For judges charged with determining a young
woman's ability to make an abortion decision without including her parents,
courts have looked beyond "social skills, level of intelligence, or verbal
skills"' and focused on the minor's "experience, perspective, and judgment."' 1'
The courts have not required that a young woman in a judicial bypass proceed-
ing harbor adult level experience, that she be independent from her family, or
close to the age of majority.' 2 Courts have defined maturity, and therefore
competence in this context, with reference to
intellectual capacity, experience, and knowledge necessary to substantially under-
stand the situation at hand and the consequences of the choices that can be made, or
the capacity to understand and evaluate the type of procedure that the physician
intends to use to perform the abortion and the possible complications associated with
the use of the procedure and with the performance of the abortion itself.'
3
In the healthcare arena, a finding that a person is legally competent fol-
lows a determination that the subject is capable of giving informed consent to
treatment, meaning consent that is knowing, intelligent and voluntary.' 4 This
means that she has a decision-making capacity developed enough to allow her
to understand her situation as it is explained to her, including the risks and
I Berg et al., supra note 4, at 352-54.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 353-56 (citations omitted).
8 Id. at 357.
9 Daniel A. Beals, Bioethics in Pediatric Practice, June 30, 2004, available at http://www.
emedicine.com/ped/topic2769.htm.
'o William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Statutes
Requiring Parental Notification of or Consent to Minor's Abortion, 77 A.L.R. 1, 2 (2005).
"1 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
" Britner et al., supra note 3, at 40 ("Competence' is a term that often subsumes the three
conditions necessary for a legally valid medical treatment decision. An informed decision
must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.").
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benefits of proposed treatments or a failure to treat, and to decide how to pro-
ceed based upon her own desires and values. Finally, she must be able to com-
municate that decision to those charged with implementing or respecting her
choice.
B. Criminal Culpability and Developmental Capacity
The elements of competence for purposes of criminal culpability are not
wholly dissimilar from those discussed in the previous section on healthcare
decision-making. When a young person stands accused of a crime, it is initially
necessary to evaluate her competence to stand trial. Competence for this pur-
pose is a combination of two factors: (1) her ability to assist counsel in her
own defense, and (2) her decision-making competence.' 5
The recommendations that emerged from the 1995 conference on the Ethi-
cal Representation of Children incorporated specific language detailing how an
attorney for a young person should go about determining the client's ability to
participate in her own legal representation. According to the conference rec-
ommendations, lawyers for young people should assess the client's develop-
mental stage by referring to cognitive ability, socialization, and emotional
development.' 6 The lawyer should also evaluate the client's "expression of a
relevant position," her "individual decision-making process," and her "ability
to understand consequences."
1 7
A young person's ability to act as a meaningful participant in her own
defense and communicate with her attorney has been termed "adjudicative
competence" '18 or decisional competence. 9 The core skills required for such
competence are an ability to understand the criminal proceeding, make deci-
sions about her defense, and provide assistance to her attorney.20 More specifi-
cally, a decisionally competent young person will have "the capacity to engage
in reasoning processes and to make judgments with input from counsel.' Her
advanced decision-making capacity will allow her to evaluate consequences,
consider options, and make decisions based on her personal calculations and
preferences.22
" Thomas Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 3, 8 (1997) (citing Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants:
A Theoretical Reformulation, 10 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 291 (1992)).
16 Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of
Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301, 1313 (1996) reprinted in 6 NEV. L.J. 1408 (2006).
17 Id.
18 Barry C. Feld, Competence Culpability, and Punishment: Implications of Atkinsfor Exe-
cuting and Sentencing Adolescents, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV 463, 523 (Winter 2003) (citation
omitted). An ability to assist counsel depends upon the existence of the "capacity to grasp
the meaning of the legal procedure and to participate in it with counsel." Grisso, supra note
15, at 8. This means that the defendant must be able to "understand the proceeding... and
appreciate the significance of these matters for his or her own situation." Id. Finally, com-
petence to assist counsel requires the ability to communicate information to counsel that is
relevant for a defense." Id.
19 Grisso, supra note 15, at 8.
20 Feld, supra note 18.
2 1 Grisso, supra note 15, at 8.
22 Id.
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To manifest this competence, the defendant "must understand the purpose
of the trial process, to provide information to and process information from
counsel, to reason appropriately, and realistically to apply that information to
the legal situation she confronts."'2 3 In the criminal court context, with its low
threshold for establishing a defendant's competence for finding him criminally
culpable, it is extremely important to discover the cases in which youthful inca-
pacity should mitigate responsibility or punishment.
24
While not always discussed in such terms, courts must also evaluate juve-
nile defendants on their competence to commit a crime, meaning their ability to
intend to engage in the criminal activity. This inquiry again touches upon the
criminal defendant's developmental capacity to understand the consequences of
her actions and her choice to act in the face of those consequences.
In the end calculus, while there may be some differences in nuance, the
question of competence or capacity, whether in reference to healthcare, crimi-
nal culpability, or participating in a lawyer/client relationship, focuses on a few
narrow and overlapping categories. At its core, decision-making capacity is a
central component of an individual's overall competence. The fundamental
inquiry, whether termed an evaluation of competence or capacity, is whether
the person being judged possesses the requisite skill to understand her circum-
stances when explained to her and make reasoned, even if not reasonable,
choices about how to proceed. If so, she possesses the required competence
and the law should treat her accordingly. If, however, she lacks these skills of
understanding and reason, she is incompetent and the law, in whatever context,
should treat her in accordance with that finding.
In criminal law, establishing a defendant's inadequate decision-making
skills could lead to a determination that the defendant is not criminally culpable
or is not morally culpable to an extent that justifies imposition of the death
penalty or a life sentence. In the context of a lawyer client relationship, a lack
of competence might require a lawyer to seek a guardian for a client, while still
endeavoring to include the client in whatever level of decision-making is
appropriate given her skill level. Finally, in the context healthcare, a lack of
competence or capacity might translate into a determination that a young per-
son is incapable of making independent decisions thereby requiring the inter-
vention of an adult decision maker.
Given that judgments about competence or the lack thereof carry with
them serious consequences in both criminal and healthcare care law, there is a
tendency to seek easy ways to measure the presence or absence of such compe-
tence. Presumptions of competence may help to streamline some court pro-
ceedings, but these presumptions may lead to unintended or undesirable results.
A presumption of incompetence for purposes of healthcare decision-mak-
ing that offered no exceptions to the usual requirement of parental involvement
in all healthcare decisions made by young people may discourage some minors
from accessing needed care for fear of having to confront their parents. This
potential consequence is part of the rationale behind statutes that allow young
people to access treatment for sexually transmitted infections, prenatal care,
23 Feld, supra note 18, at 523-24 (citation omitted).
24 Id.
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abortion, or drug treatment without parental consent or notification. 25 A pre-
sumption of adolescent incompetence that made these healthcare emancipation
statutes suspect could have a detrimental impact on young people.
On the positive side, in the criminal context, a presumption of adolescent
incompetence would shield minors from criminal culpability, extended criminal
sentences, incarceration in adult facilities, or the death penalty and could create
greater opportunities for rehabilitation of youthful offenders.
If the law presumes that young people are decisionally capable in the
healthcare context, it is more likely that minor patients can form trusting, confi-
dential relationships with their healthcare providers thus potentially improving
treatment outcomes. Further, there will be less incentive for young people to
avoid needed medical care for fear of reprisals from their parents. On the nega-
tive side, if the legal system presumes that youthful offenders are decisionally
capable, these young people will become eligible for severe adult sanctions,
including the death penalty, and have fewer opportunities for education and
rehabilitation.26
Ultimately, this article concludes that it is possible to understand the
developmental richness of young people in a way that may protect an adoles-
cent from adult prisons and criminal culpability while also acknowledging that
young people, in most circumstances, can and should be allowed to engage in
independent healthcare decision-making. Thus, to the extent that presumptions
of competence or incompetence could serve a valid purpose in dealing with
adolescents, it would be appropriate and consistent to presume incompetence in
the criminal law and presume competence for purposes of healthcare decision-
making. This split makes sense when one considers that the settings in which
decision-making takes place about healthcare or criminal activity are radically
different and, therefore, the quality and character of adolescent decision-mak-
ing is wildly divergent in these two areas. I will elaborate on the question of
context-specific decision-making in Part IV. First, I will turn to an explanation
of just how differently advocates and the courts describe the decision-making
capacities of young people in criminal and healthcare decision-making.
25 Jennifer Rosato, Let's Get Real: Quilting a Principled Approach to Adolescent Empow-
erment in Health Care Decision-Making, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 769, 778 (2002).
26 It is not a given that a default position of adult decision-making capacity would necessa-
rily work to the detriment of adolescents facing criminal prosecution. As explained by one
author:
Decisional capacity for adolescents who are 15 and older should be carefully considered in [the
juvenile justice] context. A chief consideration should include acknowledgement of adolescent
decisional ability, which would not careen the rehabilitative course of the juvenile justice system;
rather, it would comport with social norms embraced by this area of the law, along with trends in
other legal arenas, such as family law and tort, that accord recognition to adolescent decisional
ability. Forthright recognition of decisional capability, coupled with attention to constitutional
safeguards and effective legal representation for adolescent defendants, would enhance fairness
and uniformity, yet provide defense counsel the opportunity to proffer mitigating evidence, such
as diminished capacity, when appropriate. Consequently, a decisional autonomy approach
toward adolescents accused of criminal offenses would increase fact finding accuracy and fair
treatment calibrated by essentials of due process, especially in a climate where adolescents are
increasingly charged with crimes and confronted with criminal sanctions.
Hartman, supra note 3, at 1300-01 (citations omitted).
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III. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: ARE ADOLESCENTS BIG KIDS, LITTLE
ADULTS, OR NEITHER?
This section describes how advocates and the Supreme Court have utilized
developmental literature and arguments based on that literature to justify vari-
ous courses of action in criminal law and healthcare decision-making law as
they pertain to adolescents. While abortion and the death penalty are extreme
subjects to use as the basis of this discussion, they are two of the more useful
areas in which to confront the issue of adolescents and development for at least
two reasons.
First, both subjects are so contentious and politically divisive that they
generate copious amounts of scholarly discussion and multiple Supreme Court
cases. Thus, there is a rich background of discussion illuminating the ways in
which the law has configured adolescents. Further, the disparate way that
advocates have positioned adolescents in the context of these discussions pro-
vides a great base for determining how to make sense of seemingly contradic-
tory assertions.
Second, both abortion and the death penalty have a particular impact on
adolescents as opposed to young children because it is those who are on the
margins of legal majority for whom it is most difficult to dictate a consistent
position on the question of competence. It is rare, though not impossible, for a
six-year-old to possess adult competence. It is significantly more likely that
one will find an advanced level of competence among the average, rather than
the extraordinary, sixteen-year-old. This reality fosters difficulties in staking
out a position on legal capacity for adolescents.
Thus, by focusing on the extremes of imposition of the death penalty and
abortion decision-making, this Part identifies the dichotomous understanding of
adolescents within the law.
A. Evaluating the Adolescent Patient's Competence
Juvenile justice advocates claim adolescent incapacity to engage in crimi-
nal behavior with culpability comparable to that of adults. Strategically, this
position supports the goal of keeping young people out of the adult criminal
justice system, including adult prisons, and avoiding the possible use of the
death penalty for adolescents. By contrast, advocates seeking access to various
forms of healthcare on behalf of young people regularly advocate a view of
adolescent decision-making competence that is on par with that of adults.
These advocates urge changes in the current healthcare decision-making legal
canon that keeps young people from making independent decisions about their
own healthcare in most circumstances. For these advocates, the law's vision of
young people as underdeveloped and incompetent for purposes of most health-
care decisions is deeply flawed.
Those writing and working in the healthcare arena do not proffer a singu-
lar position on adolescent decision-making capacity. It is clear, though, that
concerning certain healthcare related topics, there are many who believe that a
broad based policy of adolescent incapacity is developmentally inaccurate and
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fails young people and their families. 27 As patient's reach age thirteen to fif-
teen, healthcare providers should become increasingly concerned with evaluat-
ing the decision-making capacity of their young patients and seeking their
assent, if not consent, to treatment. 28 Research suggests that at some point
during early-to mid adolescence, young people in various research settings
exhibit decision-making capacities on par with those of adults. 29 Based on this
type of research, the range of voices calling for changes in the law spans from
those focused on adolescent girls and the decision to terminate a pregnancy,30
to those who concentrate on adolescents and right to die issues,3' and others
who make broad based claims about adolescent capacity to direct their own
healthcare.3 2
In an earlier writing, this author expressed opposition to the law's general
command that those under the age of eighteen not be able to make their own
decisions about healthcare, instead granting wide authority and sole legal deci-
sion-making power to parents and other adult caretakers.33 Though there are
27 See, e.g., Michelle Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, 24 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 127
(Summer 1996); Rosato, supra note 25; A Proposal to Simplify the Law of Teenage Medical
Decision-Making, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 501-32 (December 2001) (arguing for a bright line rule
of allowing those sixteen and older to make routine healthcare decisions independent of
parents or guardians).
28 See, e.g., Beals, supra note 9 ("Between age 13 years and legal adulthood, pediatricians
should evaluate the child's ability to understand and provide informed consent."). Seeking
assent is conceptually similar to an informed consent process except that it seeks to have a
young patient agree to a course of treatment even though she does not have the power to
actually give or withhold legally binding consent. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics Comm. on
Bioethics, Informed Consent, Parental Permission, and Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95
PEDIATRICS 314, 314 (1995) [hereinafter Pediatrics Comm.].
29 See, e.g., Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and
Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589, 1595-96 (1982);
David G. Scherer, The Capacities of Minors to Exercise Voluntariness in Medical Treatment
Decisions, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 431, 436 (Aug. 1991); Thomas Grisso & Linda Vier-
ling, Minors' Consent to Treatment: A Developmental Perspective, 9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 412,
425 (Aug. 1978). One author summed up relevant research as follows:
Overall, the findings of informed consent researchers have been quite consistent. Minors, espe-
cially adolescents, are more similar to adults than the law assumes in both the choices they make
and in the logical processes they follow. This is not to say that the results of all of these investi-
gations have been entirely consistent; but by and large, minors aged 14 years and higher make
decisions regarding the waiver or rights or consent to medical procedures in generally the same
manner that adults do. In some situations, children as young as nine years choose outcomes
congruent with those chosen by adults, but the processes and reasoning behind these decisions
are different. Analyses of social costs, however, may emphasize the need to consider judgment
factors (e.g., consideration of social consequences) as well as cognitive and reasoning ability in
determining adolescents' legal capacities.
Britner et al., supra note 3, at 46 (citations omitted).
30 See, e.g., Britner et al., supra note 3; Heather Boonstra & Elizabeth Nash, Minors and the
Right to Consent to Healthcare, THE GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PuB. POL'Y, Aug. 2000, at 4.
31 Ann Eileen Driggs, The Mature Minor Doctrine: Do Adolescents Have the Right to Die?,
11 HEALTH MATRIX 687 (2001).
32 See, e.g., Walter J. Wadlington, Consent to Medical Care for Minors, in CHILD.'S COMPE-
TENCE TO CONSENT; Hartman, supra note 3, at 1269; Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 29,
at 1595-96.
33 Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Whose Body Is It Anyway: An Updated Model of Healthcare
Decisionmaking Rights for Adolescents, 14 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 251 (2005).
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critical exceptions to the general rule of adolescent capacity,34 I contend that
such exceptions are too limited to achieve the goal of protecting and promoting
adolescent autonomy35 and articulated a standard of shared decision-making
power between parent and minor children age fourteen and older with an
opportunity for adolescents to opt-out of sharing decision-making in some
cases. The exception to the power of opt-out exists when the young person
lacks decision-making capacity or if the young person is making a decision
with a substantial risk of leading to death or permanent disability.3 6 A shared
decision-making model based on a presumption of adolescent competence
directly conflicts with the basic legal regime premised upon a belief that all
minors, whether seven or seventeen, are incapable of mature decision-making.
The basis of the shift in the legal regime for which this author has argued
is twofold. First, the argument rests on a belief that to deny adolescents the
opportunity to be equal participants in decisions about their own healthcare and
34 The common law mature minor exception combats this baseline assumption of incompe-
tence in situations where it is patently false or inappropriate. This exception holds that a
person under the age of majority who evidences sufficient maturity, as assessed by a presid-
ing judge, may make independent healthcare decisions. JAMES MORRISSEY ET AL., CONSENT
AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE HEALTH CARE OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 2 (1986).
Courts have used this exception to allow young people who possess the requisite indicia of
maturity to make serious and even life-ending medical decisions before they have reached
the age of eighteen. See, e.g., In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 325 (Ill. 1989) (court allowed
seventeen-year-old Jehovah's witness dying from leukemia to refuse life-saving blood trans-
fusions); In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202 (Md. 1990) (allowing parents to effectuate the desire of
a seventeen-year-old in a persistent vegetative state to end artificial nutrition). While the
baseline legal rule is one of adolescent incapacity, as Justice Kennedy indicates in his Roper
v. Simmons opinion, in the context of healthcare, there are significant exceptions to a rule of
broad based adolescent incapacity. While it is true that young people will generally need to
secure parental permission to access healthcare, a majority of states allow a young person to
make independent healthcare decisions about pregnancy or in relation to a known or sus-
pected sexually transmitted infection. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8-6 (2004); CAL. FAM.
CODE § 6925 (West 2004); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 577A-2, 577A-3 (Michie 2002)
(allowing for disclosure to parents at the discretion of the healthcare provider); IDAHO CODE
§ 39-4302 (Michie 2004). Some states also allow independent healthcare decisionmaking
for young people who are married or who have joined the military. See, e.g., IND. CODE
ANN. § 16-36-1-3(a) (Michie 2002) (providing that minor must be emancipated, married,
divorced, in the military, authorized by statute, or fourteen or older and living away from
parents); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-123b (2005) (requiring minor to be sixteen or older); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 41-41-3 (1972) (providing that minor must have intelligence to understand
procedure and its consequences); N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:17A-4 (2006) (providing that a health-
care provider may inform parents at its discretion). Similar status emancipation statutes for
healthcare purposes allow young people living with sexually transmitted infections to access
disease related healthcare independent of their parents. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 121010 (West 2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 39a-592 (1958) (requires parental consent
unless healthcare provider believes that parental involvement would result in non-treatment
or if minor request that parents not be informed); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16 § 710 (1974);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-1605 (1981) (allows for testing for HIV and healthcare provider may
inform parents at her discretion); GA. CODE. ANN. § 31-17-7(a) (2004) (healthcare provider
may disclose to parents at her discretion); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 577A-2, 577A-3
(Michie 2002) (healthcare provider may disclose at her discretion); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 141-C:18.(II) (2002) (minor must be fourteen or older).
3- Mutcherson, supra note 33, at 277.
36 Id. at 304.
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provide opportunities for independent healthcare decision-making is to reject
the innate autonomy of young people.37 Second, available developmental liter-
ature reliably supports a contention that most adolescents who have attained the
age of fourteen possess the ability to make reasoned decisions about their own
healthcare and should be supported in doing so.38 Failing to recognize this
reality leads only to fracture in families and in healthcare provider/patient
relationships.39
Eschewing a shared decision-making model, others have emphasized a
desire to favor young people with more far-reaching powers of parental exclu-
sion. Especially in the abortion arena, advocates have repeatedly made calls to
change the law to unburden young women from any requirement to involve
parents or judges in their decisions about ending a pregnancy.4 ° Others have
sought to limit the power of judges in judicial bypass proceedings to counteract
potential political or gender bias by, for instance, incorporating a presumption
of maturity into these proceedings. 41 Frequently, references to research stand-
ing for the proposition that young women are developmentally capable of mak-
ing their own decisions about pregnancy 42 accompany these calls for change.
In an amicus brief filed in conjunction with State of Ohio v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health,4 the American Psychological Association ("APA")
argued against parental notification or consent requirements based in part on a
belief that young women possess the decision-making capacity necessary to
make informed decisions about abortion. The authors of the brief explained:
Psychological theory and research about cognitive, social and moral development
strongly supports the conclusion that most adolescents are competent to make
informed decisions about important life situations.... Developmental psychologists
have built a rich body of research examining adolescents' capacities for understand-
ing, reasoning, solving problems and making decisions, especially in comparison to
the same capacities in adults.
Research consistently supports the conclusion that there is a predictable development
during late childhood and early adolescence of the capacity to think rationally about
increasingly complex problems and decisions. Although there are several competing
theories of cognitive development, these theories each recognize that a revolution in
rationality occurs during early adolescence.
44
The APA specifically makes a claim that those who have reached the age
of fourteen or fifteen reason about moral dilemmas in a similar way as adults
and comprehend "social rules and laws."4 5 Young people in this period of
middle adolescence possess "adultlike intellectual and social capacities includ-
37 Id. at 272-77.
3s Id. at 283-91.
39 Id. at 280-83 and 291-98.
40 See, e.g., Britner et al., supra note 3.
1 Suellyn Scamecchia & Julie Kunce Field, Judging Girls: Decision Making in Parental
Consent to Abortion Cases, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 75 (1995).
42 See, e.g., Nancy E. Adler, et al., Abortion Among Adolescents, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
211 (March 2003); Britner et al., supra note 3, at 40.
43 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
"4 Brief for American Psychological Association, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioners/Cross-Respondents, Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990)
(Nos. 88-1125, 88-1309) [hereinafter APA Akron Brief].
45 Id.
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ing specific abilities outlined in the law as necessary for understanding treat-
ment alternatives, considering risks and benefits, and giving legally competent
consent."-
4 6
It is the case, then, that a significant number of scholars and advocates
believe that young people harbor reasoning and understanding capacities on par
with those of adults several years before their eighteenth birthdays. Given that
these young people possess such advanced abilities, it is wrong to assume that
they are not competent to make many of their own healthcare decisions without
the aid, input, or control of their parents.
B. The Supreme Court and Adolescent Patients
The Supreme Court has struggled to articulate a coherent position on ado-
lescents and access to healthcare that protects young people from bad decisions
while respecting their growing decision-making capacities. As is true with the
death penalty in the context of criminal law, abortion cases force the Court to
answer the question of the role of adolescents within families and the existence,
or lack thereof, of adolescent ability to make significant decisions with far
reaching consequences.4 7
In Bellotti v. Baird, in which the Court adjudicated the Constitutionality of
a parental consent for abortion statute, the Justices faced a named plaintiff rep-
resenting the "class of unmarried minors in Massachusetts who have adequate
capacity to give a valid and informed consent [to abortion], and who do not
wish to involve their parents."48 That the courts allowed this young woman to
proceed as a representative of young people with sufficient maturity and skills
to make abortion decisions indicates some appreciation for the fact that there
are minors who are capable of informed and mature decision-making.
In the course of declaring the challenged parental consent statute unconsti-
tutional, the District Court in Bellotti noted that potentially a sizeable majority
of seventeen-year-olds and a significant portion of those sixteen and younger
are capable of giving informed consent to an abortion procedure.49
Whereas the lower court acknowledged the decision-making capacity of
many pregnant women under the age of eighteen, the Supreme Court based its
46 Id; see also Michael A. Grodin & Joel J. Alpert, Informed Consent and Pediatric Care, in
CHILD.'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 99 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983) ("For many con-
sent decisions, the older child (13 years or above) is developmentally competent to make
reasonable judgments as well as conceptualize and analyze actions and consequences.
Within the framework of a particular psychosocial situation, it would appear quite sufficient
to utilize sole consent by minors for the initiation and carrying out of a therapeutic
regimen.").
" Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 639 (1979) ("Massachusetts has attempted to reconcile
the constitutional right of a woman, in consultation with her physician, to choose to termi-
nate her pregnancy as established by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973), with the special interest of the State in encouraging an unmarried
pregnant minor to seek the advice of her parents in making the important decision whether or
not to bear a child").
48 Id. at 626.
49 Id. at 631 ("many, perhaps a large majority, of 17-year olds are capable of informed
consent, as are a not insubstantial number of 16-year olds, and some even younger." Id.
citing Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (Mass. 1978) (Baird III)).
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analysis on its earlier jurisprudence allowing states to circumscribe the choices
of young people where "serious consequences" might result.50 The court based
these rulings on its recognition that "during the formative years of childhood
and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment
to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.5 '
In language mirroring later pronouncements in cases involving juvenile
defendants, the Court explains that their immaturity prevents minors from mak-
ing "fully informed choices that take account of both immediate and long-range
consequences."5 2 As such, according to the Court, it is appropriate and consti-
tutional to legislate in a manner that encourages, if not mandates, parental
involvement in the abortion decisions of unmarried minors.
Particularly in the context of abortion, pro-choice advocates have long
forcefully made the argument for adolescent capability to make independent
abortion related decisions.5 3 There is a significant body of literature that stands
for the proposition that young women are, in fact, largely capable of making
decisions about terminating a pregnancy without the assistance of their par-
ents.5 4 The APA has asserted that available studies support the claim that
young women between fourteen and eighteen-years-old are no different from
adults when it comes to the factors related to legal competence and abortion
decision-making.
55
Supreme Court jurisprudence, however, undermines the position of pro-
choice advocates. Thus far, the Court has refused to uphold state parental con-
sent statutes that provide parents with a unilateral veto of a young woman's
choice to terminate a pregnancy.56 Though states cannot confer veto power on
parents, the Court does allow states to strongly encourage parental involvement
50 Id. at 635.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 640.
-1 See, e.g., Soc'Y FOR ADOLESCENT MED., Position Paper: Reproductive Healthcare for
Adolescents, 12 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 649 (1991) ("[Tlhe decision to terminate a preg-
nancy should rest with the pregnant adolescent in concert with the advice and counsel of her
physician."); Brief of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists as Amici
Curiae Supporting Appellees at 88-805 and Cross Respondents at 88-1309, Ohio v. Akron
Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
4 According to the APA:
The two most directly relevant studies compared abortion decisionmaking by adolescents and
adults at the time they received pregnancy tests in actual treatment settings. Results of both are
consistent with the research and theory reviewed above showing that "adolescents are as able to
conceptualize and reason about treatment alternatives as adults are."
APA Akron Brief, supra note 44 (citing Lewis, A Comparison of Minors' and Adults' Preg-
nancy Decisions, 50 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 446 (1980); Ambuel, Developmental Change
in Adolescents' Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion: An Empirical
Study and Quantitative Model of Social Policy (1989) (Dissertation Abstracts Int'l)).
51 APA Akron Brief, supra note 44 ("[E]mpirical studies of treatment and abortion decision-
making have found no differences between adolescents aged 14-18 and adults in factors
related to legal competence. There is therefore no scientific foundation for the States'
assumption that adolescents' decisions to have an abortion are generally less thoughtful and
informed than adults' decisions.").
56 Bellotti v; Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462
U.S. 416, 439-41 (1983).
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through laws requiring parental notification of a young woman's decision to
end a pregnancy. 57 By taking this position, the Court does not articulate a
belief in widespread adolescent competence. To the contrary, Supreme Court
abortion jurisprudence makes clear that the Court generally trusts parents more
than young women to make the best decisions about continuing or ending a
pregnancy.
As the Court explained in Bellotti:
As immature minors often lack the ability to make fully informed choices that take
account of both immediate and long-range consequences, a State reasonably may
determine that parental consultation often is desirable and in the best interest of the
minor. It may further determine, as a general proposition, that such consultation is
particularly desirable with respect to the abortion decision-one that for some people
raises profound moral and religious concerns.
5 8
When a young woman determines that consultation with her parents prior
to consenting to an abortion is not in her own best interest, the Court allows
states to establish a judicial bypass system that substitutes judges for parents in
the minor's decision-making process. Therefore, abortion jurisprudence ulti-
mately cannot stand for the proposition that young women are developmentally
capable of making decisions to terminate a pregnancy without consultation with
parents or the judicial system. Instead, the Court's abortion decisions reinforce
a paradigm of adolescent incompetence.59
Though the abortion debate is probably the most politically fraught arena
in which the Supreme Court struggles with minors and healthcare decision-
making, it is just one context in which the Court has limited adolescent health-
care decision-making. In Parham v. J.R., the Supreme Court faced the vexing
question of what process is due to a minor child when parents seek to have that
child committed to a state operated mental health facility.60 There was no dis-
pute in the case over the fact that children have a liberty interest in avoiding
unnecessary confinement and medical treatment. 6 1 In describing the relation-
ship among parents, minor children, and the State, the Court wrote:
Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the fam-
ily as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children.... The law's concept
of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in matur-
ity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult deci-
sions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection
lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.
62
17 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994).
58 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 640.
'9 As explained by one author:
Thus, under the model constructed in Bellotti II, pregnant girls seeking abortions, though very
likely to receive judicial consent, have not been granted autonomy as the term is normally under-
stood. Rather, they have been granted a peculiar sort of burdened autonomy that substitutes state
authority for parental authority, and that asks pregnant girls to show far more initiative and
competence than the Court has asked of adult women seeking abortions.
Janet L. Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood: Legal Models of Children and the Parent-Child
Relationship, 61 ALB. L. REV. 345, 413-14 (1997) (citations omitted).
60 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 587 (1979).
61 Id. at 600.
62 Id. at 602 (citations omitted). In a similar vein, Justice Stevens writing separately to
concur notes:
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In Parham, the Court acknowledged its earlier determination in abortion
jurisprudence that parental power over minor children is not so extensive so as
to let stand a state law creating an absolute parental veto over a minor woman's
decision to end a pregnancy. 6 3 However, the Court's characterization of ado-
lescents remained firmly rooted in a belief of adolescent decision-making inca-
pacity. The Court explained, "[m]ost children, even in adolescence, simply are
not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions, including their
need for medical care or treatment."'64 Thus, the Court's jurisprudence on abor-
tion and adolescents provides a foundation for other cases involving young
people and healthcare decisions.
In its healthcare-decision making jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
trod a path of primarily protecting parental interest in directing the lives of their
offspring and attempting to reconcile this interest with whatever Constitutional
rights can be said to belong to minors. In the realm of abortion, while the Court
acknowledges the significance of the abortion right that is at stake, the Court
ultimately limits the right because of worry about a young woman's ability to
responsibly exercise this right without adult intervention.
C. Evaluating the Adolescent Criminal Defendant's Competence
As previously described, there are at least two aspects of juvenile compe-
tence in the context of criminal prosecutions. The first encompasses a young
person's ability to understand and control her actions before she engages in
criminal behavior coupled with her ability to intend her bad acts and compre-
hend the consequences of her criminal conduct. The second is the adolescent
criminal defendant's ability to understand the workings of the criminal justice
system that will adjudicate her behavior, including the challenges and responsi-
bilities of being in an attorney/client relationship. This second component of
competence demands an evaluation of the adolescent criminal defendant's
responsibility for her own defense as measured by her capability to appreciate
the nature of criminal proceedings, waive her Miranda rights, and/or direct the
actions of her defense counsel.65
Juvenile justice advocates have taken positions on both the question of
decision-making capacity sufficient to justify criminal responsibility and the
decision-making capacity sufficient to allow a young client to direct her legal
representation. These advocates have fought for an understanding of adoles-
cents as uniquely positioned; thus, calling into question the wisdom of adjudi-
cating their alleged criminal acts in the adult criminal justice system.66
Under our law, parents constantly make decisions for their minor children that deprive the chil-
dren of liberty, and sometimes even of life itself. Yet surely the Fourteenth Amendment is not
invoked when an informed parent decides upon major surgery for his child, even in a state
hospital. I can perceive no basic constitutional differences between commitment to a mental
hospital and other parental decisions that result in a child's loss of liberty.
Id. at 624.
63 Id. at 603.
64 Id.
65 Grisso, supra note 15; Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights:
An Empirical Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134 (1980).
66 See, e.g., C. Antoinette Clarke, The Baby and the Bathwater: Adolescent Offending and
Punitive Juvenile Justice Reform, 53 KAN. L. REV. 659 (2005).
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Simultaneously, advocates have argued that young people can and should have
access to the panoply of rights, including the right to counsel, routinely made
available to adult defendants. 67 Advocates have also argued that the lawyer's
duty to an adolescent client in a criminal or delinquency proceeding is concom-
itant to that owed to an adult client in similar circumstances, including a duty to
maintain confidences.68
D. Competence and Criminal Culpability
As to the first competence issue, that of the presence of sufficient compe-
tence to support a finding of criminal culpability, the law excuses a defendant
from criminal responsibility only when he lacks the capacity or the fair oppor-
tunity to refrain from criminal conduct.69 Punishment for a crime should be
proportional to the actor's blameworthiness and cannot solely be measured by
the harm caused by the criminal act. 70 When an accused lacks decision-making
capacity entirely or has diminished capacity to make the wholly autonomous
choices assumed by the criminal law, that defendant is "not as blameworthy as
other offenders. ' 'T Where there is diminished capacity, a finding of culpability
may be altogether inappropriate or that diminished capacity may warrant a less
severe punishment for the convicted defendant.72 Youth is frequently a marker
of a diminished capacity that makes a defendant's action less blameworthy than
might otherwise be the case.
67 Historian Steven Mintz writes:
Children's rights reformers stressed that juveniles were denied basic due process rights, even
after the high court's decision in Gault. While Gault gave minors the right to written notice of
charges, the right to cross-examine witnesses, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the
right to cross-examine witnesses, it denied them other rights, such as indictment by a grand jury,
release on bail, and a right to a public trial and a trial before a jury.
HUCK'S RAFr 330-31 (2004).
68 Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering
for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1505, 1564 (1995);
Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Chil-
dren, supra note 16, at 1301.
69 Joshua Dressier, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 17.03[E] (3d ed. 2001) (discussing
the personhood theory which requires that we "excuse people whose ability to reason practi-
cally is grossly disturbed or underdeveloped (e.g., insane people and infants) ... [and] those
whose opportunity to reason practically is seriously undermined on an individual occasion
(e.g., due to passion or coercion)"; Paul H. Robinson, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMI-
NAL LAW 83 (1997) ("the actor can point to abnormal circumstances or abnormal character-
istics that make it too difficult for the actor to appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of
his or her conduct or too difficult to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law").
70 Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Devel-
opmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1009 (2003).
71 Feld, supra note 18, at 465; see also David 0. Brink, Immaturity, Normative Competence,
and Juvenile Transfer: How (Not) to Punish Minors for Major Crimes, 82 TEX. L. REv.
1555, 1572 (2004) ("If normative competence is a condition of responsibility, then the
reduced or diminished normative competence of juveniles calls into question most of the
punitive reforms to juvenile justice.").
72 Brink, supra note 71, at 1572-73 ("Insofar as punishment should be proportional to desert
and desert is itself the product of the wrongfulness or harm of an agent's act and the agent's
responsibility for the act, the diminished competence of juveniles provides a retributive
rationale for reduced punishment for juveniles.").
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This societal understanding of the unique positioning of youthful offend-
ers is part of the rationale for a system of juvenile justice separate from the
system responsible for adult criminals. The evolution of the juvenile justice
system over the years has sometimes been in tandem with the developmental
literature. At other times, changes to the system came about in opposition to
progress in scientific understanding of the cognitive development of children
and adolescents. Two leading experts on adolescent development and capacity,
Elizabeth Scott and Thomas Grisso, describe the periods of change as follows:
One way to think about the evolution of legal policies responding to youthful crime is
in terms of the empirical account of adolescence that these policies tacitly express.
From this perspective, the traditional (pre-Gault) juvenile court was shaped in impor-
tant ways by a conception of errant youth as childlike, psychologically troubled and
malleable. On this view, the job of the court was not to punish, but to rehabilitate
and protect its charges. With the reform movement of the 1970s and 1980s, a less
idealized view of adolescence emerged, together with a growing skepticism about the
potential for rehabilitation. Immature youth were seen as less culpable than adults,
but not as blameless as children. Lacking experience and judgment, young offenders
needed lessons in accountability. A perusal of the current landscape of juvenile jus-
tice reform suggests a view of delinquent youth as appropriately subject to adult
punishment and procedures and thus as indistinguishable in any important way from
their adult counterparts.
73
The Grisso and Scott article concisely encapsulates several arguments
made by juvenile justice advocates eager to protect young people from adult
courts and adult sentences. The authors pose two central challenges to the idea
of adolescents as indistinguishable from adult criminals that regularly appears
in the scholarly literature. First, the authors refute the competence assumption
that is blind to meaningful differences between adolescent and adult criminal
actors.7" They explain:
Modem developmental psychology provides substantial, if indirect, evidence that
adolescent choices about involvement in crime and their decisions as defendants in
the legal process reflect cognitive and psychosocial immaturity. This evidence chal-
lenges contemporary juvenile justice policies which discount the importance of con-
ventional notions of criminal responsibility and constitutional requirements for fair
proceedings (neither of which the critics challenge directly). 75
The second critique offered by Grisso and Scott is of the "utilitarian
assumption" holding that the social cost of juvenile crime warrants adult sanc-
tions for young offenders even if there are substantial developmental differ-
ences between adolescents and adults. 76 This assumption proves untenable
because most juvenile crime reflects transitory delinquency on the part of
young people that will dissipate as they mature.77
73 Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 138 (1998)
(citations omitted).
74 Id. at 139; see also Steinberg, supra note 70 ("First, and most obviously, adolescents'
level of cognitive and psychosocial development are likely to shape their choices, including
their criminal choices, in ways that distinguish them from adults and that may undermines
competent decision making.").
75 Scott & Grisso, supra note 73, at 139.
76 Id.
77 Id.
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As for decision-making capacity, which is a reflection of a young person's
overall level of competence, Scott and Grisso explain that the capacity to make
decisions grows throughout childhood and that while "there is great variability
among individuals, preadolescents and younger teens differ substantially from
adults in their abilities."78 As we age, our ability to process information and
think in hypotheticals expands and we become more adept at using thinking
skills acquired earlier in life.7 9
Ultimately, Scott and Grisso determine that when understood within the
parameters of the excuse doctrine in criminal law, young people who are still in
the throes of their development should benefit from a presumption of "dimin-
ished responsibility.., but not a lack of responsibility." 80 The authors take the
sensible and defensible position that within the criminal justice system
"[A]dolescence can usefully be conceptualized as a probationary period, in
which young decision-makers learn to make responsible choices, without bear-
ing the full costs of their mistakes."8 1 If adolescence is seen in this way, then
the legal system should provide consequences for young people who commit
crimes so that it is understood that bad behavior warrants punishment but that
punishment should be less severe than that meted out to older offenders "who
have been given the opportunity to learn to make better choices. 8 2
Other scholars similarly argue against adult sanctions for adolescent crimi-
nal defendants, including asserting the inappropriateness of subjecting youthful
offenders to life sentences without parole.8 3 As one advocate explained:
Criminal responsibility and moral blameworthiness hinge on cognitive and volitional
competence. In a framework of deserved punishment, it is unjust to impose the same
penalty on offenders who do not possess comparable culpability. Younger offenders
are not as blameworthy as adults because they have not yet fully internalized moral
norms, developed sufficient empathic identification with others, acquired adequate
moral comprehension, or had sufficient opportunity to learn to control their actions.
In short, they possess neither the rationality-cognitive capacity-nor the self-con-
78 Id. at 157.
79 id. at 157-58.
80 Id. at 172; see also Feld, supra note 18, at 507 ("Youths differ from adults in their
breadth of experience, short-term versus long-term time perspective, attitude toward risk,
impulsivity, and the importance they attach to peer influence. These differences are linked
to developmental process and affect their qualities of judgment and ability to appreciate the
consequences of their actions. These generic developmental differences justify a less puni-
tive stance toward younger offenders, which allows them to survive the mistakes of adoles-
cence.") (citations omitted).
81 Scott & Grisso, supra note 73, at 175.
82 Id. (citations omitted); see also Feld, supra note 18, at 506-07 ("While adolescents pos-
sess sufficient cognitive competency to justify some degree of punishment, psycho-social
maturity of judgment and temperance provide a broader framework through which to assess
their culpability. Most youths lack the maturity of judgment characteristic of adulthood in a
variety of areas - perceptions of risk, appreciation of future consequences, capacity for self-
management, and ability to make autonomous choices. Their decision-making preferences
and values are in a state of transition, and they are prone to make poorer judgments than they
would make several years later.") (citations omitted).
83 Feld, supra note 18, at 535; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL & HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, For the Rest of Their Lives: Life Without Parole for Child Offenders (October 12,
2005), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AMR511622005ENGLISH/$File/
AMR5116205.pdf.
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trol-volitional capacity-to justify equating their criminal responsibility with that
of adults.
8 4
Thus, according to these advocates for youth, juveniles should not be tried
in adult courts or subjected to adult punishments because most adolescents lack
the maturity and cognitive capacity required to evidence an adult level of culpa-
bility warranting severe criminal sanction."
Advocates also argue that age should be a factor in criminal law because
immaturity influences the possible deterrence effect of punishment.8 6 Young
people who are inordinately affected by peer pressure, prone to recklessness
and risky behavior, and inadequately equipped to consider consequences will
not be likely to consider negative outcomes before engaging in criminal behav-
ior, thus negating the use of criminal sanctions as a deterrent.
87
E. Adolescents as Clients
The second aspect of competence in the juvenile justice arena is the ado-
lescent defendant's ability to participate in and direct her own legal representa-
tion.88 In this context, Scott and Grisso explain:
Studies on youths' understanding of matters related to trials, such as the roles of
participants and the trial process, have found that youths under the age of fourteen
typically are deficient in their knowledge of the legal process and its basic purposes.
In contrast, few differences in basic understanding of trial-related matters have been
observed between adolescents fourteen to seventeen years of age and adults, when
the populations studied were "average" adolescents. Similarly, a conventional grasp
of the nature of legal rights typically has developed by mid-adolescence. Moreover,
fundamental abilities of sensation, perception, and memory ordinarily have matured
by early adolescence, suggesting that adolescents on average should be as capable as
adults of providing accurate information to their attorneys from their experience.
8 9
Other advocates offer a similar view on the ability of young people to
meaningfully participate in and direct their own defense in juvenile delin-
quency proceedings. At the 1995 Fordham Conference, Ethical Issues in the
Legal Representation of Children, the working Group on the Allocation of
Decision Making took the position that "[tihe law should be changed to include
the presumption that all children in delinquency cases are unimpaired and are
therefore entitled to direct the attorney in the representation to the same extent
as an adult client."90 This position goes further than simply asserting adoles-
cent competence. The Working Group members aver a far-reaching claim of
8 Feld, supra note 18, at 502.
85 Scott & Grisso, supra note 73.
86 Brink, supra note 71, at 1573 ("[T]he deterrent effect of sanctions crucially depends on
potential criminals being rational calculators of expected utility. Immaturity compromises
this assumption.").
87 Id.
88 This discussion carries over into any lawyer/client relationship involving a person under
the age of eighteen. In all such situations, the lawyer struggles with questions of how the
client's age and cognitive capacity should impact the representation.
89 Scott & Grisso, supra note 73, at 169 (citations omitted).
90 Proceedings of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children:
Report of the Working Group on the Allocation of Decision Making, 64 FORDiAM L. REv.
1325, 1328 (1996).
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minor competence that includes even young children until and unless the child
client proves to be incompetent. 9 ' These advocates, then, stake out a strong
position of adolescent competence to participate in and direct their own repre-
sentation even in serious cases. The overall Conference Recommendations sug-
gest, "[t]he lawyer for a child who is not impaired (i.e., who has capacity to
direct the representation) must allow the child to set the goals of the representa-
tion as would an adult client."9 2
Focusing on child welfare proceedings, Professor Jean Koh Peters also
urges lawyers for children to work within the paradigm of a "competence
default" described as follows:
A child's lawyer should begin each representation with the presumption that the cli-
ent can understand the legal issues in the case and express subjective perspectives or
offer critical information about them. To the extent that the child's developmental
state creates obstacles to communication and understanding, it is part of the lawyer's
job to overcome them creatively in order to provide the child client with the benefits
of an advocate who listens, informs, counsels, and answers questions.
Because this presumption is critical to effective representation, it can only be over-
come when the lawyer has independent evidence, arising outside the representation,
that the child is incapable of understanding the legal issue or expressing a view of
it. 93
Though Peters focuses her writing on children in abuse and neglect pro-
ceedings, one could certainly extrapolate her position to adolescents facing
criminal charges. These young people, who are entitled to legal representa-
tion,94 are also entitled to a lawyer who does not assume the young person's
incompetence and who begins the representation with the belief that, as is true
of an adult client, the client will make decisions about how the representation
proceeds. Even in the face of a client who proves to be incompetent, Peters
holds that "effective representation requires that the lawyer continue communi-
cating with the client at the level of sophistication of which the client is capable
.... [Tihe determination that a child cannot 'adequately act in his own inter-
est' must be made on a decision-by-decision, not on a child-by-child basis."95
Some advocates admit that most average adolescents age fourteen and
older are largely capable of understanding the mechanics of a criminal trial and
the nature of their legal rights as criminal defendants. Youthful offenders,
however, may suffer from deficiencies that impair their ability to participate in
their own defense.96 Thus, while the law should protect young people from the
extreme sanctions of a criminal justice system created for adults, these advo-
cates also claim that the lawyer for a young person is obligated to respect the
client's control of the representation as she would for an adult client unless the
young person lacks competence.97
91 Id.
92 Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of
Children, supra note 16, at 1301.
93 Peters, supra note 68, at 1564.
94 In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34-42 (1967).
95 Peters, supra note 68, at 1565.
96 See Scott & Grisso, supra note 73, at 169 (citations omitted).
97 Report of the Working Group on the Allocation of Decision Making, supra note 90, at
1329-30.
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Some might argue that Scott, Grisso and others who place themselves in
the same camp seek to have it all. They do this by citing adolescent deficien-
cies for purposes of avoiding adult sanctions and simultaneously asserting ado-
lescent decision-making capacity for purposes of demanding the full rights of
criminal defendants for young people. To plausibly make such claims, it is
necessary to believe that one young person can be competent to engage in some
activities and make some decisions, while still lacking adult competence in
other areas. Part IV of this article explores this dichotomy in greater depth.
F. The Supreme Court and Adolescent Defendants
There are several competency evaluations that might take place over the
course of a criminal proceeding. There might be a question of a defendant's
competence to stand trial,9 8 or his competence, in terms of his ability, to form
the requisite criminal state of mind. There may also be a question of whether,
even if competent to stand trial and to be found guilty of a crime, the defen-
dant's competence level is sufficient to find moral culpability to justify a given
punishment, specifically the death penalty.9 9 This section will focus on the
question of the competence of a juvenile defendant as a measure of the applica-
bility of severe punishments.
Undeniably, the death penalty is an extreme punishment. One has no need
to question why juvenile justice advocates work diligently and tirelessly to
remove the death penalty from the realm of possible sanctions for crimes com-
mitted by minors. As evidenced by numerous articles in scholarly journals,
many commentators believe that convicted criminals who commit capital
crimes before they turn eighteen lack the developmental capacity to justify
holding them fully culpable for those crimes, at least to the extent that to be
held fully responsible would encompass the possibility of capital
punishment. 'o
The campaign to protect young people from excessively harsh treatment in
the criminal justice system has dealt with issues beyond imposition of the death
penalty. Nevertheless, the continuing debate over capital punishment and the
Supreme Court's recent curtailment of the use of capital punishment for juve-
nile offenders provides a ripe landscape for comprehending how commentators,
courts, and advocates understand adolescent development for purposes of crim-
inal justice proceedings. Further, because death is a uniquely harsh and finite
punishment, it is in the context of the death penalty that the Court has "most
thoroughly explored culpability, proportionality, and deserved punishment."' 0 '
98 In general, a defendant is not competent to stand trial unless he possesses "sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understand-
ing-and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him." Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960); see also Cooper v.
Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996).
9 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002) ("Those mentally retarded persons who
meet the law's requirements for criminal responsibility should be tried and punished when
they commit crimes. Because of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and con-
trol of their impulses; however, they do not act with the level of moral culpability that
characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct.").
"o See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 66; Feld, supra note 18.1o Feld, supra note 18, at 466 (citations omitted).
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In many respects, Supreme Court jurisprudence in the area of juvenile
justice has embraced Scott and Grisso's view of adolescent competence for
purposes of conferring rights on juvenile defendants and adolescent incapacity
for purposes of doling out criminal culpability and adult punishments. In 1967,
the Court held that minors subjected to juvenile delinquency proceedings have
a panoply of due process rights including the right to written notice of proceed-
ings, the right to counsel, the right to refuse to self-incriminate, and the right to
confront witnesses." However, in 1989, the Court held that states did not
offend the Constitution by allowing the use of capital punishment when a
defendant was sixteen or seventeen-years-old when he committed the crime for
which he was punished.' °3
Most recently, the Court in Roper v. Simmons held that death sentences are
unconstitutional when applied to young people convicted of capital crimes
committed before they reach the age of eighteen." 4 The Court's discussion of
why it chose to depart from its earlier holdings that allowed the use of the death
penalty for those sixteen and older at the time that they committed capital
crimes illustrates the complexity of contending with adolescent defendants.
The road to a determination of the unconstitutionality of the juvenile death
penalty began in cases decided long before the Court heard Roper. In Gregg v.
Georgia, the Supreme Court observed that capital punishment serves the two
social purposes of retribution and deterrence. 10 5 The Court has continued to
refer back to these two purposes in subsequent death penalty cases and when
those social purposes are not served, the Court has found the use of the death
penalty unconstitutional.
One arena in which the Court held that retribution and deterrence ratio-
nales failed was in the use of the death penalty against mentally retarded
defendants. Using language that it would later recycle in cases involving
juveniles and the death penalty, the Court wrote in Atkins v. Virginia:'0 6
With respect to retribution . . . the severity of the appropriate punishment necessarily
depends on the culpability of the offender .... If the culpability of the average
murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, the
lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of
retribution.
With respect to deterrence... "it seems likely that 'capital punishment can serve as a
deterrent only when murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation.'"
Exempting the mentally retarded from that punishment will not affect the "cold
calculus that precedes the decision" of other potential murderers. Indeed, that sort of
calculus is at the opposite end of the spectrum from behavior of mentally retarded
offenders. The theory of deterrence in capital sentencing is predicated upon the
notion that the increased severity of the punishment will inhibit criminal actors from
carrying out murderous conduct. Yet it is the same cognitive and behavioral impair-
ments that make these defendants less morally culpable-for example, the dimin-
ished ability to understand and process information, to learn from experience, to
102 In Re Gault, 387 U.S. at 1.
103 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
1094 (1982).
'04 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
105 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
106 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002).
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engage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses-that also make it less likely that
they can process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a
result, control their conduct based upon that information ... ,,107
Of further concern to the Atkins Court was the risk of the unjust applica-
tion of the death penalty to developmentally disabled people who were more
prone to make false confessions and who were less capable of putting on miti-
gating evidence."' 8 The Court also expressed concern that these defendants
"may be less able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typi-
cally poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an unwarranted impres-
sion of lack of remorse for their crimes." 10 9 In the end, these factors all
increased the risk that the developmentally disabled capital defendant might be
wrongfully sentenced to death.1t O
One cannot dispute the importance of Atkins to the Court's repudiation of
the juvenile death penalty in Roper. The Roper majority, many of the Roper
amici writing for Respondent Roper, and other scholars rely heavily on com-
parisons between adolescents and the developmentally disabled to justify a ban
on the use of capital punishment for minors."' 1 In both cases, while a defen-
dant, either developmentally disabled or a minor, may have a level of decision-
making capacity that allows a jury to find sufficient criminal culpability to
support a conviction, it does not follow that these defendants act with the moral
culpability necessary to warrant imposition of the death penalty.'
1 2
In Roper, the Court and several amici used comparisons between adoles-
cents and the developmentally disabled to explain why adolescents were gener-
ally incapable of evidencing a level of moral culpability sufficient to support
both criminal responsibility and use of the ultimate punishment of death. 11 3 As
the American Bar Association ("ABA") explained in its amicus brief:
Juveniles share nearly all of the developmental characteristics of the mentally
retarded that support their categorical ineligibility for the death penalty. Like the
mentally retarded, juveniles have decreased abilities to regulate their actions, under-
stand the correlation between their actions and the consequences of those actions, and
to appreciate the impact of the resulting punishment for their actions. Moreover,
recent scientific research supports the conclusion that the brains of juveniles are less
developed than those of non-mentally retarded adults. Moreover, juveniles have
fewer life experiences to inform their decision making. Thus, like the mentally
retarded, while juveniles may know the difference between right and wrong and may
be competent to stand trial, they are less competent decision makers than non-men-
107 Id. at 319-20 (citations omitted).
108 Id. at 320-21 (citation omitted).
109 Id. at 321.
"0 Id. at 320-21 (citation omitted).
'11 See, e.g., Feld, supra note 18, at 477-78 ("Characteristics that reduce the culpability of
mentally retarded offenders-susceptibility to peer influences, a propensity to act impul-
sively without thinking about consequences, and immaturity of judgment-have relevance to
the criminal responsibility of adolescents.").
112 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
113 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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tally retarded adults because they have underdeveloped decision making
capacities. 114
Amici also argue that, as is true for the developmentally disabled, impos-
ing the death penalty on juveniles does not serve the retribution and deterrence
rationales. Retribution fails because it is predicated on moral culpability and
youthful offenders are less morally culpable for their crimes than are adults.ll 5
The deterrence rationale fails because an impulsive adolescent who does not
consider consequences and who is convinced of her own invincibility will be
no more deterred by the possibility of the death penalty than she is by the risk
of a life term in prison.' 6
As articulated by various Roper amici, the developmental deficiencies
characteristic of juveniles have an even greater negative impact on the possibil-
ity of reaching a just result in a capital case because young people are more
likely to be coerced or intimidated into making false confessions because of
their immaturity." 7
Even without reference to the characteristics shared by adolescents and the
developmentally disabled, diverse voices speaking against imposition of the
death penalty for juvenile defendants made several arguments about juvenile
incapacity in their Roper amicus briefs. These organizations espoused a view
of adolescents as incapable of possessing adult culpability for criminal activity
or moral culpability sufficient to warrant a punishment of death. The ABA
brief noted that "juvenile offenders are less mature, less experienced, less able
to exercise good judgment and self-restraint, more susceptible to environmental
influence, and limited in their ability to assist in their own defense.""' 8
In the same vein, the American Psychological Association ("APA") brief urged the
Justices to recognize that young people take far more risks than adults and "under-
value the true consequences of their actions." 
119
Similarly, as compared to adults, "studies show that adolescents are less
likely to consider alternative courses of action, understand the perspective of
others, or restrain impulses." 1
20
"' Brief of Amicus Curiae of the American Bar Association in Support of the Respondent,
at 9-li, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633) (citations omitted) [hereinaf-
ter ABA Brief].
115 Id. at 12.
116 Id. at 11-12; see also APA Akron Brief, supra note 44, at 14-15 ("With regard to deter-
rence, capital punishment will have a questionable effect on adolescents as a group because
they are more impulsive and less able to anticipate the consequences of their actions.").
1' ABA Brief, supra note 114; see also Brief of the Coalition for Juvenile Justice as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 15, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-
633) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Coalition for Juvenile Justice Brief] ("Juveniles, like the
mentally retarded, have many difficulties in all aspects of the legal process-beginning with
the police interrogation. CJJ's research reveals that juveniles are more likely, because of
their immaturity, to make a false confession.").
18 ABA Brief, supra note 114, at 2. Of course, the amici recognize that young people are
not a monolith and that "some juvenile offenders deserve severe punishment for their crimes.
However, when compared to adults, juvenile offenders' reduced capacity-in moral judg-
ment, self restraint and the ability to resist the influence of others-renders them less respon-
sible and less morally culpable than adults." Id. at 3.
" APA Akron Brief, supra note 44, at 6-7.
120 Id. at 7.
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The APA brief also claims that biological factors may explain the differ-
ences in cognitive ability between adults and adolescents, as the adolescent
brain has not yet reached its adult form. 12 1 While much work remains in the
arena of brain development and adolescent decision-making capacity, the crux
of this still developing research is that "in late adolescence, important aspects
of brain maturation remain incomplete, particularly those involving the brain's
executive functions."1 22
At least one Roper' amicus also expressed concern that young people
lacked the capacity to meaningfully participate in their own defense, thus lead-
ing to a denial of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
123
Before its Roper decision, the Court had previously described the underly-
ing premise of its juvenile justice jurisprudence as beneficent paternalism "in
the sense of a caring, nurturing parent making decisions on behalf of a child
who is not quite ready to take on the fully rational and considered task of
shaping his or her own life." 124 The Justices went on to explain that society
assumes that, as a collective, children "do not yet act as adults do, and thus we
act in their interest by restricting certain choices that we feel they are not yet
ready to make with full benefit of the costs and benefits attending such deci-
sions.' 25 Given this societal assumption, the Court found irony in the sugges-
tion that these assumptions about differences in children versus adults could not
be used to protect minors from imposition of the death penalty. For the sake of
consistency, the Court felt compelled to determine that it is "likely cruel, and
certainly unusual, to impose on a child a punishment that takes as its predicate
the existence of a fully rational, choosing agent, who may be deterred by the
harshest of sanctions and toward whom society may legitimately take a retribu-
tive stance."'
126
In Roper, the Court continued to embrace a view of minors as develop-
mentally incapacitated such that they are not eligible for the death penalty, even
when they have committed atrocious crimes. Citing their own common sense
121 Id. at 9 ("Recent research suggests a biological dimension to adolescent behavioral
immaturity: the human brain does not settle into its mature, adult form until after the adoles-
cent years have passed and a person has entered young adulthood.").
122 Id. at 12; see also Coalition for Juvenile Justice Brief, supra note 117, at 9-10 (citing
research indicating that the adolescent brain is not yet fully formed which contributes to
adolescent "impulsivity and mood swings"); Feld, supra note 18, at 515 ("Neurobiological
evidence suggests that the human brain does not achieve physiological maturity until the
early twenties and that adolescents simply do not have the same physiologic capability as
adults to make mature decisions or to control impulsive behavior." (citation omitted)); BAR-
BARA STRAUCH, THE PRIMAL TEEN (2003).
123 Coalition for Juvenile Justice Brief, supra note 117, at 1 I (citation omitted) ("The
diminished capacity of juveniles directly affects their ability to communicate with and direct
their counsel, as well as their faculty for making important trial and procedural decisions.
Many adolescent defendants, because of their relationship with authority and their develop-
mental process, either do not perceive their attorney as being on their side or fail to give their
attorney information about the charges against them out of mistrust.").
124 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825 n.23 (1988).
125 Id.
126 Id. For a similar discussion of the inconsistency in the law's treatment of young people,
see, American Bar Association Juvenile Justice Center, A Deadly Contradiction (Jan-
uary 2004), available at http://ccjr.policy.net/proactive/newsroom/release.vtmlid=35841
(describing the many provisions of state law treating minors differently than adults).
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as well as more scientific sources, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
describes three key differences between juvenile and adult offenders that sup-
port a conclusion that minor criminal defendants should not be grouped
"among the worst offenders."1 27
First, embracing the Scott and Grisso position on adolescent capacity, the
Court explains that "as any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological
studies respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm" adolescents are immature
.and more understandably irresponsible than adults are. 128  Second, they are
more inclined to act in the absence of clear thinking about consequences.129
Third, and finally, the Court observes that peer pressure is a greater risk for
young people and that their characters are more malleable than those of
adults. 3 ° Thus, the Court explains that a young person's personality is more
"transitory" than that of an adult. 3 1
Taken as a whole, adolescent immaturity, susceptibility to peer pressure,
and the malleability of personality make it difficult to label a young person as
being among the worst class of criminal actors. 13 2 In the words of the Court:
Their own vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their immediate sur-
roundings mean juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing
to escape negative influences in their whole environment. The reality that juveniles
still struggle to define their identity means it is less supportable to conclude that even
a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved char-
acter. From a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a
minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor's character
deficiencies will be reformed.
13 3
Advocates and the Supreme Court believe that the bulk of adolescent
defendants possess a diminished ability to appreciate the consequences of their
actions and to avoid acting out in ways that are reckless and perhaps criminal.
Further, even when they do become lawbreakers, it is likely that the non-con-
forming behavior of adolescents is fleeting and youthful offenders are more
amenable than their adult counterparts are to attempts to correct their bad
behavior. This reality means that young people accused of crimes are deserv-
ing of more leniency and protection than are adults who have committed
crimes.
IV. TRUE CONFLICT?
Thus far, this article has highlighted three areas in which adolescent com-
petence, or the lack thereof, determines a regime of legal rights available to
young people. These areas are criminal culpability, healthcare decision-mak-
ing, and the ability to form an attorney/client relationship. This section will
focus primarily on the first two issues, which reflect the greater distance in the
articulation of adolescent competence or incompetence.
127 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
128 Id. at 569.
129 Id. (citations omitted).
130 Id. at 570 (citations omitted).
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
Spring 2006]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
When viewing the issue of competing views of competence through the
lens of the Supreme Court, one finds a thread of continuity to an extent that is
not true of the advocates with whom this article concerns itself. From the per-
spective of the Supreme Court, young people are consistently flawed and gen-
erally immature whether they are committing capital crimes or seeking to
terminate an unwanted pregnancy. The language used by the Court in cases
dealing with adolescent competence in these two arenas is strikingly similar
even if the outcomes may initially appear contradictory.
In its abortion jurisprudence, while extending some protection to adoles-
cent women seeking to end their pregnancies, the Supreme Court does not stake
a claim for the maturity of young women. Instead, the justices who support a
young woman's right to seek an abortion without the knowledge or consent of
her parents do so based on several rationales including an assertion that abor-
tion, like the death penalty, is different and therefore requires some bending of
the general rule on parental consent for healthcare for minors. 134 In the words
of the Court:
The abortion decision differs in important ways from other decisions that may be
made during minority. The need to preserve the constitutional right and the unique
nature of the abortion decision, especially when made by a minor, require a State to
act with particular sensitivity when it legislates to foster parental involvement in this
matter. 135
The Court carefully avoids making a general pronouncement on adoles-
cents and limits its decision to abortion to the extent that the decision seems to
devalue the primacy of the parental role in raising children.
In the end, the Court's abortion decisions rest on an understanding of
young people in general and young women in particular as generally lacking in
mature decision-making ability. Thus, it is appropriate and constitutionally
acceptable for states to require some measure of adult supervision of the abor-
tion decisions made by young women. They can do this either by mandating
parental involvement or requiring that a judge determine that the minor is
mature or that, even if she is immature, an abortion is in her best interest.
In the criminal context, the Court's Roper decision stands for the proposi-
tion that people under the age of eighteen, as a class, lack the criminal compe-
tence that would allow for the imposition of a death sentence. 13 6 As described
in an earlier section of this paper, juvenile justice advocates claim that many
adolescents lack the developmental skills to warrant criminal culpability in gen-
eral. 137 Even if a young person's actions warrant a finding of criminal culpa-
bility, the justice system should not subject young offenders to more severe
sanctions such as incarceration in adult prisons, life sentences, or the death
penalty.' 38 According to these advocates, the law should treat young criminal
defendants differently for a variety of reasons including their greater potential
13' Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1979).
135 Id.
136 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
131 See supra notes 65-97 and accompanying text.
'31 See discussion supra notes 98-133 and accompanying text.
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for rehabilitation, their still developing brains, their susceptibility to peer pres-
sure, their impulsiveness, and their reckless nature.' 3 9
Of course, to say that the Court is consistent is not to say that the Justices
are right. There is little to no value in having a consistent position if that posi-
tion does not comport with reality. Thus, the section that follows offers another
way to conceptualize adolescent competence that can be consistently applied
across areas of law and that acknowledges the complexity of the competence
inquiry as well as its shifting terrain from person to person and from decision to
decision.
A. Agreeing to Disagree
Advocates in the criminal arena and the healthcare decision-making arena
agree in some ways. Both sides agree that it is useful and, perhaps, even neces-
sary to turn to developmental psychology' 4 ° to evaluate how to create a legal
regime, whether criminal or healthcare related, that properly deals with the
needs and issues of adolescents.' 4 ' Both sides also seem to agree that there are
differences between adolescents and adults for which the law can and should
compensate in the context of making policy for healthcare or criminal justice.
While advocates for adolescents may agree that young people are in a
unique stage of life that policies meant to govern their actions should reflect, it
is the case that advocacy groups do not necessarily agree on the consequences
of these differences or the full extent to which they exist. When the two groups
assert conflicting understandings of adolescent competence, they potentially
weaken the other's cause with the result that both sides suffer.
Viewing the claim of a single organizational actor, one can see how advo-
cates can even contradict their own work. In an amicus brief submitted in an
abortion case, the APA and others explained that competent decision-making
depends on "social and personality development including the development of
personal values, identity, autonomy, and the ability to resolve social dilem-
mas.,"'4 The amici informed that Court that:
Research in social and personality development contradicts the stereotype of adoles-
cence as a period when young people are paralyzed by a struggle for identity, social
confusion and rebellion against parents. In fact, by middle adolescence (age 14-15)
young people develop abilities similar to adults in reasoning about moral dilemmas,
understanding social rules and laws, reasoning about interpersonal relationships and
interpersonal problems, and reasoning about custody preference during parental
divorce. By middle adolescence most young people develop an adult-like identity
and understanding of self. Furthermore, the majority of adolescents do not repudiate
parental values, but incorporate them, during their search for autonomy. Thus, by
age 14 most adolescents have developed adultlike intellectual and social capacities
including specific abilities outlined in the law as necessary for understanding treat-
139 See discussion supra notes 65-97 and accompanying text.
140 Developmental psychology "studies changes across the life-cycle in physical, social,
intellectual, and emotional development, and, from its earliest foundation, has posited that
young people move through a sequence of stages in legal reasoning and moral decision
making." Feld, supra note 18, at 502.
"4 See, e.g., Britner et al., supra note 3, at 40; Scott & Grisso, supra note 73.
142 APA Akron Brief, supra note 44.
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ment alternatives, considering risks and benefits, and giving legally competent
consent. 143
Several years later, in a case seeking an end to the juvenile death penalty,
the APA joined an amicus brief that made several observations about adoles-
cent immaturity noting that adolescents are greater risk takers than adults and
that young people do not have a full grasp of the consequences of their
actions.'44 Rather, as described earlier in this article, adolescents "as a group,
often value impulsivity, fun-seeking, and peer approval more than adults
do."'145 Young people, apparently, are also "less likely to consider alternative
courses of action, understand the perspective of others, or restrain impulses." 146
If the same collection of people can offer such competing images of young
people, all supported by research, it is not surprising that the law struggles with
how best to understand adolescent patients and defendants. The fact that those
on both sides, all of whom seek to do what is best for young people, assert such
disparate positions on adolescent competence is of no great surprise given the
overall legal and political climate in which these advocates find themselves. In
no small part, the work of advocates reflects a reasoned response to the rhetoric
of their political opponents whom they oppose. In the juvenile justice arena,
advocates for young people battle a system that dangerously and inaccurately
assumes "that there are no psychological differences between adolescent and
adult offenders that are important to criminal responsibility or to participation
in adult criminal proceedings."' 14 7 To accept this regime is to accept that there
is no reason to treat a fourteen-year-old criminal differently than a forty-year-
old criminal-a position that leaves young people exceedingly vulnerable to
abusive and unjust treatment at the hands of the legal system.
Those who advocate for an expanded understanding of adolescent compe-
tence in healthcare do so in response to arguments of incapacity that would
leave young people subject to the desires of their parents or caretakers when
making incredibly intimate and personal decisions about a range of healthcare
issues, including abortion. Advocates for young people in the healthcare arena
use available data, limited though it may be, to argue that the law's treatment of
young people for purposes of making autonomous healthcare decisions is prob-
lematic and results in a regime that works to the detriment of young people. 148
Significant literature from healthcare providers and professional organizations
for these providers supports a view that legal decision makers have unfairly
characterized adolescents collectively as incompetent.149
In their work, Scott and Grisso take specific issue with the claim that from
about the age of fourteen, adolescent decision-making capacities rival those of
adults thus justifying greater self-determination rights for young people includ-
143 Id.
'4 Coalition for Juvenile Justice Brief, supra note 117, at 9.
"I APA Akron Brief, supra note 44, at 7.
146 Id.
117 Scott & Grisso, supra note 73, at 151.
148 See, e.g., Hartman, supra note 3.
149 See Society for Adolescent Medicine, Access to Healthcare for Adolescents: A Position
Paper of the Society for Adolescent Medicine, 13 J. OF ADOLESCE Nr HEALTH 162 (1992);
PEDIATRICS COMM., supra note 28, at 317.
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ing the right to make informed and competent decisions about their own
healthcare. 1
50
In rejecting the usefulness of the above-described analysis for purposes of
juvenile justice, Scott and Grisso write:
Together this scientific research and theory support the claim that adolescents are
more competent decision-makers than has been presumed under paternalistic poli-
cies, but that scientific evidence for the claim that their cognitive decision-making
capacity is comparable to that of adults is unclear .... Further, the studies that sup-
port the claim of competence are small and mostly involve middle class subjects of
average intelligence. Only a handful compares the decision-making of minors with
that of adults. Finally, the studies of adolescent decision-making have been con-
ducted in laboratory settings in which the decision is hypothetical and "pre-framed"
in the sense that all relevant information is provided to the subjects. This format
yields little useful data about how decisions are made in informal unstructured set-
tings (such as the street), in which decision-makers must rely on their own experience
and knowledge in making choices. Moreover, research offers little evidence of how
minors may function relative to adults in stressful situations in which decisions have
salience to their lives.'51
Therefore, even while conceding that there is some authority behind
claims that those in mid-adolescence can reason and understand in adult ways,
the authors warn of extreme variability in the existence and employment of
these capacities. 152 They suggest that the value of structured studies on adoles-
cent decision-making involving posing hypothetical dilemmas "may be more
useful in shedding light on questions about competence to stand trial than on
cognitive capacity as it affects choices relevant to criminal conduct."'
153
This critique is at the core of the conflict between advocates that forms the
basis for this article. Disagreements about the import of research combined
with different political agendas leads to fracture among groups that do not nec-
150 Id. at 159. (citing Gary B. Melton, Toward "Personhood" for Adolescents: Autonomy
and Privacy as Values in Public Policy, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 99 (1983); Patricia King,
Treatment and Minors: Issues Not Involving Lifesaving Treatment, 23 J. FAM. L. 241, 252-
53 (1985); Stephen B. Billick, Developmental Competency, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIA-
TRY & L. 301, 306-08 (1986); Brief for Am. Psychological Ass'n as Amicus Curiae support-
ing Appellees, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (No. 88-805) (arguing against
parental notification of adolescent abortion decision, in part on ground that adolescents have
similar decision-making competence); Brief for Am. Psychological Ass'n as Amicus Curiae
supporting Appellees, Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 484 U.S. 171 (1987) (No. 85-673).
"I Scott & Grisso, supra note 73, at 159-60 (citations omitted).
152 Id. at 160 (citations omitted).
153 Id. As another author explains:
Some of the developmental changes parallel the imputations of responsibility associated with the
common law infancy defense, and by mid-adolescence most youths acquire cognitive reasoning
capacity roughly comparable to that of adults. When, for example, youths make informed con-
sent decisions for psychotherapy or medical treatment, few bases exist to distinguish between
mid-adolescents and adults in terms of the information used or the reasoning processes
employed. Studies that equate adolescent and adult cognitive ability derive primarily from
informed consent research that emphasizes subjective preferences. But the ability to make hypo-
thetical decisions under structured laboratory conditions with complete information differs sig-
nificantly from the ability to exercise mature judgment when equipped with incomplete
knowledge, under stressful conditions, and with real-life consequences.
Feld, supra note 18, at 504 (citations omitted).
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essarily want to harm each other. For those who find merit in protecting
juveniles from adult criminal sanctions and in extending greater healthcare
decision-making rights to youth, and I suspect that there is much overlap
between the two, it behooves us to find a plausible way to make sense of both
positions.
It is not given that disagreeing about the pace at which young people
develop means that these two groups of advocates are fundamentally at odds.
However, as one author wrote:
[A]s the legal system recognizes more and more autonomy rights belonging to teen-
agers in a wide range of non-criminal matters, it inevitably creates a dissonance with
the idea that in the criminal sphere, paternalism is still appropriate. This dissonance
is evident at both ends of the political spectrum. The stereotypical liberal calls for
expanded recognition of adolescents' rights in a wide range of civil contexts, while
defending a juvenile justice system that is based on the premise that an adolescent's
choice to commit a crime is rendered less culpable because of the adolescent's age.
In contrast, the stereotypical conservative will call for full application of adult penal-
ties to adolescent criminals, but will deny the right of teenagers to make decisions
that must be respected by the law in a wide variety of other contexts, presumably on
the grounds that one so young cannot be fully capable of making such significant
choices. 154
The question then becomes whether it is possible to simultaneously
embrace the arguments made by juvenile justice advocates and healthcare deci-
sion-making advocates or if the law must pick one set of arguments over the
other.
V. RECONCILING DUELING VISIONS OF ADOLESCENTS
In his article that reflects on cognitive dissonance in the law's understand-
ing of adolescent autonomy, Professor Donald Beschle opines that one way to
reconcile conflicting views of adolescents in criminal law and abortion deci-
sion-making is to believe "that competence varies in different contexts, and the
ability to make a responsible decision as to things like health care and repro-
duction issues is noticeably different from the ability to choose to obey or not
obey the criminal law."' 5  He then explores the various difficulties that may
arise from taking such a position, though he does not delve into whether that
position is even supportable. This section takes seriously the idea that the con-
text of decision-making is relevant to a young person's competence to make a
given decision. The core claim is that decision-making in different contexts is
so qualitatively dissimilar that it is not incongruous to find that the same indi-
vidual's decision-making abilities may be sufficient to support autonomous
decision making in one realm but insufficient to support a finding of autono-
mous decision-making in a distinct set of circumstances.
It is an accepted principle among many authors that competence is not a
rigid concept and that, say in the midst of a physician-patient relationship, a
patient may be competent to make some treatment decisions and not others.
For instance, a physician might be comfortable honoring a patient's wish to not
154 Beschle, supra note 1, at 67.
155 Id. at 103.
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take an antibiotic to stave off a minor infection, but might balk at that patient's
decision to refuse a life-saving blood transfusion. The degree to which the
healthcare provider would want to ensure decision-making capacity would be
enhanced in the latter case. While decision-making capacity might be found
when refusing antibiotics, the provider would not necessarily be mistaken in
finding that the patient did not have capacity to refuse the transfusion that
would save her life. The conflicting findings would presumably reflect the
patient's deficiency in one of the hallmarks of decision-making capacity
namely her ability to comprehend relevant information, contemplate choices,
and communicate a decision.' 5
6
A determination of a lack of decision-making capacity when the patient
refused the blood transfusion might logically flow if the patient, in discussions
with her healthcare provider, clearly indicated that she did not comprehend the
seriousness of her illness. Likewise, a lack of decision-making capacity might
exist if the patient was in such a state of deterioration that she could not com-
municate a treatment choice to her healthcare provider. In either of these cir-
cumstances, the healthcare provider would be justified in believing that the
patient lacked decision-making capacity and would therefore be found legally
incompetent to make treatment decisions for herself.
When discussing questions of competence and young people, it is equally
valid to believe that determinations of competence cannot be rigid. As
described by one commentator:
Competence is not an "all or nothing" quality; it develops gradually, particularly if
the child has opportunities to try out budding skills. A child does not always have a
general level of competence. Rather, a child may be competent in one area, but not
in another, and may be competent to take on part of a given task, but not the
whole. 157
This is so in part because of the shifting terrain upon which an individual
stands when making various decisions.
In their piece on the juvenile justice system and adolescent criminal
responsibility, Scott and Grisso explore the possibility that decision-making
capacity varies in part based on the circumstances in which a decision takes
place. The authors critique available scientific literature on adolescent deci-
sion-making by highlighting the fact that the highly structured setting of such
research perhaps makes it more appropriate for understanding the decision-
making capacities of young people in the context of court hearings rather than
the off-the-cuff decision-making of "the street."' 158 In other words, how adoles-
cents make decisions in informal settings in conjunction with peers may be
very different than how those same young people embark on decision-making
in more organized, formal, and monitored settings such as a courtroom or a
physician's office.
In a critique related to that offered by Scott and Grisso, those reporting on
their own research finding comparable levels of competency to make health-
care-related decisions among adults and young people fourteen and older note
156 HASTINGS CTR., supra note 4.
157 Mflfrid Grude Flekkoy, Psychology and the Rights of the Child, in CHILDREN AS
EQUALS (Kathleen Alaimo & Brian Klug, eds., 2002).
158 Scott & Grisso, supra note 73.
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that "[t]he generalizability of these finding may be somewhat tempered by the
fact that subjects were 'normal,' white, healthy individuals of high intelligence
and middle-class background and that the situations they considered were
hypotheticals."' 5 9 Even accepting that the findings of these authors may not be
applicable to all young people, the fact that a sizeable portion of young people
possesses high levels of competence cuts in favor of a more nuanced approach
to understanding adolescent decision-making capacity in both criminal and
healthcare law.
The law, in many respects, has taken the position that, as Scott and Grisso
assert in the criminal context, "because of inexperience and immature judg-
ment, youths will make mistakes during this period" '1 6 and the best way to
protect young people from the consequences of such mistakes is to assume their
incompetence. But the decisions being made by young people who choose to
engage in criminal activity and those being made by young people seeking out
healthcare are substantially different in kind and character. Thus, when viewed
as a product of the circumstances under which decision-making takes place, a
bad decision about engaging in criminal activity might largely reflect areas in
which adolescents are deficient in the ability to make reasoned decisions. In
contrast, a decision to pursue a certain type of healthcare treatment might
reflect the best and highest level of that young person's decision-making
capabilities.
To understand how this could be the case, imagine two scenarios patterned
after actual Supreme Court cases. In the first, a seventeen-year-old girl stands
accused of committing a robbery and murder with two friends, one fifteen-
years-old and the other sixteen-years-old. For several days before committing
the crime, the seventeen-year-old and her co-conspirators engaged in lengthy
discussions about choosing a victim and how to make their endeavor "success-
ful." The instigator of the crime believed, erroneously, that, even if caught, she
and her companions could not be tried as adults or sent to an adult facility
because they were all under the age of eighteen. The motivation for commit-
ting the crime was the young woman's desire to purchase a used car.
Assuming normal development and a lack of identifiable mental health
issues, it is quite likely that this young woman would be found criminally cul-
pable for any robbery and murder ensuing from her plan to engage in this kind
of activity. From the limited facts presented, she planned her activity and she
intended all of her actions even if she did not wholly appreciate the extent of
the consequences for herself and her companions. However, one could make a
strong argument that even if criminally culpable, her decision to engage in this
activity reflects the most diminished level of decision-making capacity among
adolescents. Specifically, while she intended to commit a crime and was suc-
cessful in doing so, the quality of that decision-making, not just the ultimate
decision itself, was poor. Though she did discuss her plans to commit a rob-
bery and murder, she did so only with her peers. She engaged in planning, thus
the crime was not an impulse, but her reflection on consequences for her vic-
159 Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 29, at 1596.
160 Scott & Grisso, supra note 73.
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tim, herself, and her companions evidences recklessness and a dearth of future
thinking.
It is in this kind of scenario that concerns about impulsivity, lack of fore-
thought, diminished ability to empathize, inability to imagine a broad range of
options, and lack of knowledge and experience may be most prominent and
lead to horrible consequences. These are the on the street decisions about
which Scott and Grisso raise a red flag because in these circumstances young
,people engage in decision-making without the type of support that would allow
for more complex thinking leading to better decisions. In these settings, an
adolescent tendency to consider a minimum number of options and conse-
quences161 may rear its head. In these "unstructured informal settings, where
information is not provided, and individuals must make choices based on their
own knowledge and experience," 1 62 young people are at a decided decisional
disadvantage. Their lack of life experience, penchant for risk-taking, deficient
focus on the future, and weakness for peer influence will all serve them poorly
in this loose setting' 6 3 and will severely diminish the quality of an adolescent
defendant's decision-making.
While it is possible that some young people engage in extended periods of
speculation before committing a crime and enlist the advice of trusted adults in
making decisions to commit crimes, it seems likely that this is frequently not
the case. Instead, much of adolescent crime reflects impulsiveness, the tug of
peer pressure, and a failure to seriously contemplate the potential consequences
flowing from the criminal activity. 1"
As Feld explains:
Unlike informed consent studies conducted under laboratory conditions, in less-struc-
tured, real-life circumstances, adolescents simply may know less about risks than do
adults. They may perceive fewer alternative options than do adults. Young people
may discount negative future consequences because they have more limited experi-
ence. Disadvantaged youths, in particular, may feel a sense of "futurelessness," fatal-
ism, and despair, which inclines them to discount future consequences even more
than do other teenagers.
165
Contrast the context of an adolescent making a Roper-like decision to
engage in criminal behavior, with the decision of a young woman to end a
pregnancy without the knowledge or consent of her parents. In this second
scenario, the young person will again be called upon to use various forward
thinking capacities to evaluate the appropriateness of her decision for herself
and, perhaps, for others around her such as her parents, the biological father of
the child, and the future child. This would implicate concerns about the young
person's ability to think in critical ways about the future and imagine outcomes.
However, unlike an individual making decisions on the street about engaging in
crime, this young woman will not have to act alone or only with the benefit of
discussions with peers who may be equally deficient in the experience and
161 Id. at 165 (citations omitted).
162 Id. at 164 (citations omitted).
163 Id.
'" See, e.g., Coalition for Juvenile Justice Brief, supra note 117, at 24-29.
165 Feld, supra note 18, at 509-510 (citations omitted).
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knowledge needed to make this decision well and who may also be prone to
acting impulsively.
Most young women, even without the prodding of a parental notification
statute, will discuss a decision to have an abortion with a parent.' 66 It is highly
unlikely that most young people discuss plans for criminal activity with their
parents before committing crimes. Even those young women who choose not
to share information about their pregnancy with their parents will necessarily
have to engage with an adult professional who will provide that care, as is true
of any young person seeking services from a healthcare provider, The young
patient will participate in a process meant to ascertain whether her consent is
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.' 67 During this informed consent process,
the patient's healthcare provider will inform her of her medical diagnosis, the
available treatments and alternatives, and the risks and rewards of her decision
to pursue a particular course of treatment or no treatment at all. 168 She will,
theoretically, have an opportunity to ask questions before making a final deci-
sion and may even have a significant period in which to contemplate her deci-
sion before making a final choice. As she seeks to make a decision, she will
have a knowledgeable adult at her disposal from whom she can seek advice and
counsel about any given course of action. While it may still be possible for a
young person to make decisions that are "erroneous," those decisions will, in
large part, come after some period of reflection and deliberation that one does
not necessarily expect to take place before a decision to engage in criminal
behavior.
Even more importantly, in the context of a healthcare provider/patient
relationship, even without referring to the legal regime that allows parents to
make most healthcare decisions for young people, the healthcare provider has
an obligation to seek substituted consent for treatment when a patient appears
incompetent to make decisions.' 69 Further, in extreme cases where there is a
dispute between provider and patient about a correct treatment path, the possi-
bility of resort to court action exists. 170
It is necessary to believe in adolescent competence as an elastic concept in
order to simultaneously believe that one can be competent to commit a crime,
lack the requisite competence to warrant imposition of the harshest penalty
available for that crime, but possess sufficient competence to direct one's own
'66 APA Akron Brief, supra note 44 (citing Aida Torres, Jacqueline Darroch Forrest &
Susan Eismann, Telling Parents: Clinic Policies and Adolescents' Use of Family Planning
and Abortion Services, 12 FAM. PLANN. PERSP. 284, 287-90 (1980); Freddie Clary, Minor
Women Obtaining Abortions: A Study of Parental Notification in a Metropolitan Area, 72
AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 283, 284 (1982); Raye Hudson Rosen, Adolescent Pregnancy Decision-
Making: Are Parents Important?, 15 ADOLESCENCE 43, 44 (1980)).
167 AM. MEDICAL Ass'N, Informed Consent, www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/4608.
html (last visited May 16, 2006).
168 Id.
169 Id. ("Patients generally have a moral and legal right to refuse proposed medical interven-
tion, except when the patient has diminished decision-making capacity or must undergo
legally authorized 'involuntary' treatment.").
170 For cases where healthcare providers have been involved in court disputes over appro-
priate healthcare treatment for a minor patient, see, e.g., In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 325 (I11.
1989); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987); In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202 (Me.
1990).
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legal representation and make healthcare decisions. The fluidity of this concept
allows relevant parties to judge competence in a consistent manner across dif-
ferent types of decision-making. While there is one overarching understanding
of adolescent competence that understanding allows for a nuanced and context-
specific determination of whether youthful incapacity has interfered with a
young person's ability to make carefully considered adult-like decisions.
Some might argue, unpersuasively, that the outcome of any given legal
regime should determine whether it is appropriate. This type of ends-focused
thinking allows those who espouse it to pick a legal regime that inexorably
leads to a desired consequence.171 In such a case, the possibility of fewer
young people being confined to adult prisons or subjected to the death penalty
would justify a regime of presuming incompetence for adolescents in criminal
law. This is a positive outcome only to the extent that one believes that young
criminals should be treated less harshly than their adult counterparts. An out-
come oriented argument might also lead to a conclusion that a competence
presumption is appropriate in the context of healthcare decision-making
because it will avoid the risk of young people eschewing necessary care for fear
of being forced to discuss difficult issues with parents or other adult caretakers.
Again, this outcome makes sense only to the extent that one believes that there
are instances when parental control over young people is inappropriate or
dangerous.
Rejection of a system created simply to reach a desired end in a particular
politically charged issue does not conform to how many assume that a properly
configured legal system should function. As Professor Beschle writes:
It would be difficult to deny that American law is largely shaped by a pragmatic
concern for achieving outcomes thought desirable by majorities or influential minori-
ties, regardless of whether these outcomes can all be reconciled with each other, let
alone with some overriding philosophy. Still, most of those involved in the legal
system at least like to think of themselves as consistently applying a coherent set of
values. To simply disregard the dissonance created by inconsistent treatment of ado-
lescent autonomy would be to ignore something significant.
17 2
By focusing on the nature of development as opposed to the outcome of a
chosen legal regime, it is possible to avoid some pitfalls. Though there may be
disagreement about how to interpret available science, it is indisputable that
there are consequential differences between adults and adolescents when it
comes to making decisions. Some of these differences are strictly reflections of
time (i.e., adolescents have not lived as long and presumably have had fewer
life experiences to aid them in the process of making informed decisions about
their own conduct). Other differences may be a reflection of biology. In either
case, the result is that context is critical for determining adolescent capabilities.
A young person's decision-making skills can be enhanced when coupled with
opportunities to engage with responsible adults before making a decision
171 Beschle, supra note 1, at 102. ("Of course, the premise of this Article, that both a rejec-
tion of paternalism and support for the value of logical consistency are widely shared in the
legal and political system, may simply be incorrect. If so, both liberals and conservatives
may merely be acting as consequentialists in pursuit of different values. There may, then, be
no real dissonances to resolve".).
172 Id. at 103.
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whereas the deficiencies in adolescent decision-making are brought painfully to
light in other circumstances that play to the weakest elements of the adolescent
experience.
In the end calculus, it is probably the case that all competence evaluations,
whether in the context of criminal law or healthcare decision-making, should be
conducted on a case-by-case basis rather than creating a bright line rule that
inevitably goes too far in some cases and not far enough in others. While
bright line rules create ease of application, they do so at the expense of those
who are exceptions. In both healthcare decision-making and criminal law,
young people are well served by a view of adolescent competence that accepts
the strong possibility of adult-like decision-making while remembering that
some meaningful differences between the old and the young do exist and
should be accounted for by the legal system.
Were the Supreme Court to abandon its baseline assumption of adolescent
incapacity or incompetence, it does not then follow that its death penalty juris-
prudence would be any different, though it is quite likely that its abortion juris-
prudence would shift. For instance, in a case like Roper, the Court's focus
would still be on the developmental capacity of young people and the literature
on young people and criminal activity would still be quite relevant. However,
the inquiry would focus much more squarely on two issues: (1) the context in
which criminal decisions get made, and (2) how this context impacts whether a
minor criminal defendant can be said to be criminally culpable and the extent to
which opportunities for rehabilitation are more available for young people
whose personalities, and thus their futures, are more malleable.
For abortion cases, a shift in the Supreme Court's developmental analysis
of young people would reinforce a young woman's right to terminate a preg-
nancy and likely place that right on par with adult women who are pregnant and
contemplating abortion. Again, an evaluator would focus on the extent to
which the context in which a young woman makes an abortion decision com-
pensates for potential developmental deficiencies that might caution against
allowing young women to make independent abortion decisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is a discrepancy in the view of adolescent competence espoused by
two camps of advocates for young people. The goal of highlighting these com-
peting claims is not to suggest that either is not supportable, relevant, or worthy
of respect. Rather, the hope is that the two can co-exist without causing dam-
age to each other. Advocates can certainly make claims about adolescent com-
petence and decision-making capacity, or a lack thereof, but they must be
cognizant of potential inconsistencies in those claims and be prepared to either
accept that inconsistency or explain it away. Simply assuming that the masses
will blithely accept competing arguments about adolescent competence in dif-
ferent areas of the law without some explanation of what accounts for those
difference is a mistake.
It is not a given that this article's argument based on the importance of
context for purposes of evaluating the decision-making skills of a given young
person will be sufficient to convince the skeptical. However, the hope is that
[Vol. 6:927
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this article raises a red flag about the ways in which advocates undermine each
other's work and offers some worthwhile ideas to help knit a more coherent
narrative about adolescents and the law.
